CRAIG'S KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Stewart C. Goetz
In his book The Kalam Cosmological Argument, I William Craig attempts to prove
that the universe was caused to exist ex nihilo by a personal Creator. That the universe had a personal Creator is supposed to follow either from the fact that an
actual infinite cannot exist and a beginningless temporal series of events is an
actual infinite, or from the fact that it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite by
successive addition and, because the temporal series of past events has been
formed by successive addition, it cannot be actually infinite.
I will not review the philosophical arguments adduced by Craig to support both
the impossibility of an actual infinite and the impossibility of traversing an actual
infinite. I find Craig'S arguments quite persuasive. However, I do not think that
these impossibilities support the conclusion that the universe was caused to exist
ex nihilo by a personal Creator. In Section I, I both state an objection to Craig's
proof and the response he has given to it. Section II consists of my explanation of
why Craig'S response is inadequate and the objection is sound.

The objection to Craig's proof is fairly straightforward. From the fact that an
actual infinite temporal sequence of events cannot exist, it does not immediately
follow that the universe was caused to exist ex nihilo. Consistent with the
impossibility of an actual infinite sequence of events is the possibility that the
temporal sequence of events had a beginning but the universe did not. That is,
it is possible that there is a finite temporal series of events preceded by an eternal
quiescent or eventless universe. According to this possibility, the temporal series
of events in the universe was initiated by a distinct personal agent but this agent
did not create the universe ex nihilo. In other words, the first event caused by
the agent was not the coming into being of the universe but an event in the
already existing but previously quiescent universe.
In response to this objection, Craig constructs the following dilemma: either
the first event to arise in the quiescent universe was caused or it was not. Consider
the first alternative, that it was caused.
Either the necessary and sufficient conditions giving rise to this first
event were eternally present or not. But if these determinate conditions
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were eternally present, then their effect would also be eternally present,
which makes the occurrence of a first event impossible. On the other
hand, if the necessary and sufficient conditions for the first event were
not eternally present in the universe, then these determinate conditions
themselves had to arise in the universe, and we have only succeeded
in pushing the temporal regress of events back one more event into the
past. But we have already proved that the temporal regress of events
cannot be actually infinite because an actual infinite cannot exist. So
one must stop at a first event whose determinate conditions did not
themselves arise but already existed. But this has already been shown
to be impossible. Therefore, the first event to arise in the universe could
not be caused. 2

If the first event could not be caused, then it must be uncaused. That the first
event is uncaused is the other hom of the dilemma. Craig asserts that, while it
is logically possible that the first event is uncaused, this does not seem very
reasonable. It is inherently implausible because the first event would arise
inexplicably without any conditions whatsoever. In conclusion,
if the necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the first
event did not exist from eternity, the first event would never occur; but
if the necessary and sufficient conditions for the first event did exist
from eternity, then ... there would have been no first event. Had the
universe once been eternally and absolutely quiescent, then it never
would have awakened from its sleep of death. But since it obviously is
not quiescent, we may conclude that the finite temporal regress of events
was not preceded by an eternal, absolutely quiescent universe. 3
II

In explaining why Craig's response to the objection that the impossibility of
an actual infinite sequence of events does not entail that the universe was caused
to exist ex nihilo is mistaken, it is helpful first to point out that a cause is not
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, as Craig assumes: To understand
why a cause is not a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, consider two
interlocking gears A and B. In a situation where both are simultaneously moving,
the movement of A is necessary and sufficient for the movement of B, and the
movement of B is necessary and sufficient for the movement of A. However,
only one of the moving gears is causing the movement of the other. The fact
that one gear is causing the movement of the other cannot be explained in terms
of the relations of necessity and sufficiency, for these are identical both ways.
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The gear which is causing the movement of the other is the one which is exercising
its causal power on the other. Thus, the exercise of causal power is the fundamental concept in causation.
Given the concept of the exercise of a causal power, the foIIowing question
now presents itself: why is it impossible that a personal agent exercise its causal
power to bring about a first event in a previously existent but quiescent universe?
In response to this suggestion, Craig would probably both point out that the
exercise of a causal power is an event and that either it was caused or it was
not. On the one hand, if it (the initial exercise of causal power) was caused,
then either it was caused by a second exercise of causal power which was
exercised from eternity or it was not. If the second exercise of causal power was
exercised from eternity, then the effect (the initial exercise of causal power)
would be eternal and there would be no first event. On the other hand, if the
second exercise of causal power was not eternal but arose in the universe, then
what was the cause of that exercise of causal power? Presumably, another exercise
of causal power by the same or a different agent. But what caused that exercise
of causal power? Craig would claim that by maintaining that the second exercise
of causal power was not exercised from eternity, we end up pushing the regress
of events back step by step into the past. But is has already been proved that
the temporal regress of events cannot be actuaIIy infinite because an actual
infinite cannot exist. In short, the objector seems to be impaled on one of the
horns of a dilemma like that originaIIy constructed by Craig.
What about the other hom of this dilemma? Why is it not open to the objector
to maintain that the personal agent's initial exercise of causal power was either
uncaused or caused by the agent (agent-causation)? Craig would probably respond
that an uncaused exercising of a causal power (or an uncaused agent-causing of
an exercising of a causal power) is an inexplicable event, an event which occurs
without any conditions. However, the objector can claim that the personal agent
exercises its causal power for a reason (or causes its exercising of its causal
power for a reason), where a reason is a condition but not a causal condition of
the exercising of the causal power. 5 After all, the objector might continue, Craig
himself concludes his argument for a personal Creator by affirming that the
creation of the universe was "the action of a personal agent who freely (emphasis
mine) chooses" to create the universe. 6 A personal agent which freely creates
the universe is an agent which is not caused to exercise its causal power to
produce its effect (or, if it caused its exercise of its causal power, then it was
not caused to cause its exercise of causal power). Now, either the Creator's
creative free act occurred without any conditions whatsoever, in which case, by
his own standard, Craig would have to concede that his proof has an implausible
conclusion, or the Creator's free act was performed for a reason, in which case
Craig must concede that there is nothing implausible in the idea of a personal
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agent which does not create the universe but freely exercises its causal power
to start a finite event sequence in an already existing but quiescent universe.
In conclusion, Craig has not proved that the universe was caused to exist ex
nihilo by a personal Creator. If his arguments for the impossibility of an actual
infinite or the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite are sound, what he
has proved is either that the universe was caused to exist ex nihilo by a personal
Creator or that the universe always existed and was quiescent until some personal
agent initiated a finite chain of events in it. As of now, I know of no philosophical
argument that proves the truth of one or the other of these disjuncts.
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